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Notes
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-LIABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR
SERVICE CONNECTED INJURIES TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES
A United States Army officer on active duty was regu-
larly admitted .to an Army Hospital for surgical and medical care.
Death caused by the negligence of members of the Medical Corps
occurred while the officer was under treatment, and the officer's
widow, as executrix, brought action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' Held, the United States is liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act to members of the armed forces on noncombatant
active duty for service connected injuries caused by the negligent
conduct of army personnel. Griggs v. United States, 178 F. 2d 1
(10th Cir., 1949).
The precise question presented in the Griggs case was ad-
judged to the contrary in the district court decision of Jefferson v.
United States.2 Since the Griggs decision, the Jefferson case has
been appealed and affirmed 3 by the court of appeals for the
fourth circuit. Previous to the affirmation of the Jefferson case,
the court of appeals for the second circuit held in Feres v. United
States4 that the estate of an army officer killed by fire in unsafe
barracks in which he had been quartered through the negligence
of superior officers was not entitled to recover for his death. In
January, 1950, the second circuit again denied recovery in Ostran-
der v. United States,5 citing the Feres case as a basis for its deci-
sion. As a result of these cases, the second and fourth circuits
have taken the position that the government is not liable under
the Tort Claims Act for service connected injuries to members
1. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (Supp. 1950). Section 1346(b) provides:
"Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,
together with the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
2. 77 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Md. 1948).
3. 178 F. 2d 518 (4th Cir., 1949).
4. 177 F. 2d 535 (2d Cir., 1949).
5. 178 F. 2d 923 (2d Cir., 1950).
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of the armed forces while the tenth circuit in the Griggs decision
allowed the plaintiff to recover. The United States Supreme
Court has not had occasion to decide the issue.
The case of Brooks v. United States," in which the Supreme
Court allowed recovery for the death of a soldier on furlough
caused by a collision with a negligently driven army .truck, can
be distinguished from the Griggs decision in that the Brooks
case dealt with a non-service connected injury because the sol-
dier was on furlough and the injury was not incidental to his
military service, whereas the Griggs case dealt with a service
connected injury in that the soldier's injury was incidental to the
performance of his duties.
The problem presented in the case at hand is primarily one
of construing the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act so as
to give effect to the intention of Congress. The plaintiff relied on
the plain meaning maxim, and as Judge Murrah stated, "The
terms of the statute are clear, and appellant's action . . . states
a cause for relief under the act, unless it falls within one of the
twelve exceptions specifically provided therein; or, unless from
the context of the Act it is manifestly plain that despite the
literal import of the legislative words, Congress intended to
exclude from coverage civil actions on claims arising out of a
Government-soldier relationship. ' 7 The government made no
contention that the case fell within any of the twelve exceptions,
but it did strongly insist that regardless of the words of the
statute, Congress did not intend to include service caused injur-
ies to members of the armed forces. In support of this view the
government contends, ". . . to sustain the instant case, this court
must conclude that it was Congressional intent to give every
serviceman who was ever hospitalized a malpractice action as
well as others of a hundred different varieties against the Govern-
ment, if he should conceive that his medical care was in any
respect inadequate, or that other matters give rise to injury or
grievance. The very statement would seem to bring the matter
into the category 'of outlandish' results. It would determine that
a cause of action arose in favor of soldiers for accidents incident
to service, which no court has as yet decided and which the
Supreme Court expressly refused to consider because not in-
volved in the Brooks case."" Counsel for the government further
6. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). See Note, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 94 (1949).
7. Griggs v. United States, 178 F. 2d 1, 2 (10th Cir., 1949).
8. Griggs v. United States, brief of appellee to court of appeals, page 5.
The language referred to in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)
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pointed out that one of the most undesirable of these results
would be to subject injuries sustained in the execution of orders
to the examination of our courts, thereby impairing military dis-
cipline and encouraging public criticism.
To counter the argument of "outlandish results" made by the
defense, it was emphasized that the traditional defenses of fellow
servant, voluntary assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence are available, and exception (1), subsection (a), of the
Tort Claims Act, 9 which exempts the Government from liability
in tort in execution of laws or for the misuse of executive dis-
cretion, may be used to reduce the number of claims. Further,
it may be noted that the government's position could also lead to
outlandish results if service connected injuries are excluded and
non-service connected injuries are included. This can be illus-
trated by the example of two soldiers riding in a jeep, one on
official business and the other on furlough. If both are killed by
a negligently driven army truck, the family of the soldier on
furlough could recover thousands of dollars under the Federal
Tort Claims Act lo while the other family would recover only
several hundred dollars in the form of gratuity payments" to
the survivors of servicemen. The court of appeals in the Griggs
case takes the view that the defense of "outlandish results" is
not valid and frankly admits, "If the results of its (Congress's)
omission to exempt such claims leads to dire consequences and
absurd results, it is for Congress and not this court to provide
rational limitations.' 12
From an interpretation of the Tort Claims Act made by the
Supreme Court in the Brooks case,'13 there is a strong inference
was "The Government envisages dire consequences should we reverse the
judgment. A battle commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of
hand, a defective jeep which causes injury, all would ground tort actions
against the United States. But we are dealing with an incident which had
nothing'to do with Brooks' Army Careers, injuries not caused by their
service except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has
already transpired. Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a
wholly different case would be presented."
9. The twelve exceptions are listed in 28 U.S.C.A. § 943 (now § 2680)
(1950).
10. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
11. 38 U.S.C.A. 701 (1949).
12. 178 F. 2d 1, 3 (10th Cir., 1949).
13. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949): "The statute's terms
are clear .... We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but
that of servicemen.' The statute does contain twelve exceptions. Section 421
(now 28 U.S.C.,A. § 2680 [1950]). None exclude petitioner's claim. One is for
claims arising out of the military or naval forces or Coast Guard during
time of war .... Without resorting to an automatic maxim of construction,
such exceptions make it clear to us that Congress knew what it was about
1950]
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that the Supreme Court will hold that Congress "knew what it
was about when it used the term 'any claim'" and that Congress
certainly must have had the present problem in mind. If this be
true and there were no intent to give servicemen such cause of
action, it seems that Congress would have stated so in precise
language. To hold that there is an implied exception excluding
all servicemen on active duty would, in effect, take all the legal
significance away from the overseas and combatant activities
exceptions and render them meaningless.
Claimants find a very strong point in the legislative history
of the Tort Claims Act. "There were eighteen tort claims bills
introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935. All but two
contained exceptions denying recovery to members of the armed
forces. When the present Tort Claims Act was introduced, the
exception concerning servicemen had been dropped. '14 Also, the
claimants point to the original draft of the Tort Claims Act,
which provided that claims "arising out of the activities of the
military or naval forces or of the Coast Guard during time of
war" and "arising in foreign countries" were excluded. By an
amendment on the floor of the House,", the word "combatant"
was inserted before the word "activities." This tends to show
that Congress considered the "dire consequences" resulting if
coverage be extended to members of the armed forces and it
seems that if it were not the intention of Congress to include
such torts, the amendment would have been defeated, thereby
excluding from coverage all "activities" instead of only "com-
batant activities." Legislative intent in support of claimant's
position is further manifested by the fact that the bill which
embodied the Tort Claims Act of 1946 was introduced in the 79th
Congress with all of the twelve exceptions plus a thirteenth ex-
cluding "any claim for which compensation is provided by the
World War Veterans Act of 1924, as amended." The World
War Veterans Act' provides disability benefits to "any person
who served in the active military or naval service and who is
disabled as a result of disease or injury or aggravation of a pre-
existing disease or injury incurred in line of duty in such service."
(Italics supplied.) This thirteenth exception was rejected, there-
when it used the term 'any claim'. It would be absurd to believe that Con-
gress did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when the statute was
passed. The overseas and combatant activities exceptions make this plain."
14. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949).
15. 92 Cong. Rec. 10143 (1946).
16. 38 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (1949).
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by evidencing a congressional intention to include injuries re-
ceived in line of duty under the Tort Claims Act.
The exact significance of the repeal of the Military Claims
Act 1 7 by Section 424 (b) of the original Tort Claims Act' 8 was a
point of major controversy between the plaintiff and the govern-
ment. A provision of the Military Claims Act excluded all claims
for personal injury or death of military personnel or civilian
employees of the army, if such injury or death occurred as an
incident of their service. One court 9 has taken the position that
this was indicative of the general policy of Congress not to rec-
ognize such claims and that there was no indication of a reversal
of this policy arising from the repeal of this act by the Tort
Claims Act. But it has been very effectively argued20 that
prior to the Tort Claims Act it was the policy of Congress by
the Military Claims Act to recognize claims for injuries incurred
by military personnel when not performing their official duty;
and that the Military Claims Act was repealed because thereafter
such claims were covered by the Tort Act. It appears that if
Congress desired to continue its policy (as set out in the Military
Claims Act) of denial to servicemen of liability for injuries re-
ceived incidental to service, it would have so stated in the Tort
Claims Act in exact language and not by remaining ambiguously
silent; such silence might reasonably be taken as an indication
of an intent to discard the policy of the Military Claims Act.
In addition, it is questionable whether the Military Act should
play any part in the interpretation of the Tort Act, as liability
under the Military Act could exist without fault, whereas under
the Tort Act the traditional requisites of tort liability apply.
Since the Tort Claims Act waives the sovereign immunity
of the United States and adopts the law of the state in which the
injury occurred,21 with respect to establishing liability, this
would seem to indicate that service connected injuries were not
intended to be included under the act, for the relationship be-
tween the government and the soldier has always been exclu-
sively federal. 22 However, such an apparent "radical departure"
17. 57 Stat. 372, 31 U.S.C.A. § 223(b) (1949).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 946 (1949).
19. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Md. 1948).
20. Jefferson v. United States, plaintiff's petition for certiorari to United
States Supreme Court, page 6.
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 931(a), now § 1346(b) (1950).
22. United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 305 (9th Cir., 1947):
. the scope, nature, legal incidents, and consequences of the relation
between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived
from federal sources and governed by federal authority." Jefferson v. United
19501
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may be explained by assuming that if Congress did intend to
extend coverage to service connected injuries, the easiest method
of providing for governmental liability would be to determine
responsibility according to the state law wherein the injury
occurred, thereby eliminating the necessity of creating an entire
new body of federal tort law applicable only to servicemen.
The contention that acceptance by the injured soldier of
benefits under the military and veteran's laws precludes recovery
does not now seem to be valid for the Supreme Court has al-
lowed 23 the family of a deceased soldier to recover under the
Tort Claims Act despite provisions in other statutes for dis-
ability payments to servicemen, and gratuity payments to their
survivors.
From the foregoing contentions, it is apparent that the ques-
tion is not one that can be easily resolved. The claimants relied
mainly on the "clear words of the statute" and the legislative
history of the act while the government based its position on the
consequent "outlandish results" and radical departures from
policy if recovery were allowed. In regard to the "dire conse-
quences" urged by the defense, it appears that not all of the
results from such an extension of liability would be "outlandish."
One very desirable consequence might be increased efficiency in
the armed forces. It is reasonable to assume that if the govern-
ment has to answer in court for the negligence of servicemen,
more care would be taken to see that duties are carried out in a
competent manner, and there would be fewer examples of such
incidents as a surgeon leaving a two foot towel in the abdomen
of his soldier-patient. 24 Also, it should be recognized that public
attitude toward servicemen has taken an almost complete about-
face in the past decade, and it seems inconsistent that Congress,
while taking unprecedented steps to make the armed forces
equivalent to other vocations in pay and opportunity, intended
that the individual soldier or his family should receive an insig-
nificant sum (as compared to civilian vocations) for tortious
injuries received by the serviceman in the performance of his
duty. Such a burden should be borne not by the claimant, but
by the taxpayer. It is submitted, notwithstanding the language
States, 178 F. 2d 518, 520 (D.C. Md. 1948): ". . . but it is not reasonable to
suppose, in the absence of an express declaration on the point, that Congress
intended to adopt so radical a departure from its historic policy as to subject
internal relationships (of the armed forces) to the law of negligence as laid
down by the courts of the several states."
23. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
24. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F. 2d 518 (4th Cir., 1949).
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of the Supreme Court,2 5 that to allow recovery to a soldier on
furlough and then deny governmental liability for service
connected injuries would be an unjustified instance of judicial
legislation.
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25. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949): "Interpretation of the
same words may vary, of course, with the consequences, for those conse-
quences may provide insight for determination of congressional purpose ....
The Government's fears may have point in reflecting congressional purpose
to leave injuries incident to service where they were, despite literal language
and other considerations to the contrary. The result may be so outlandish
that even the factors we have mentioned would not permit recovery. But
that is not the case before us."
